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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
)i.MASA LYMAN CLARK, also known
as A. L. CLARK,

Civil No.
11837

Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is a case in which the Estate filed a Petition seeking to determine whether or not a contract was valid
and should be recognized and carried out by the Estate.
DISPOSITION MADE BY THE LOWER COURT
'I'he Trial Court found that there was a valid contract and directed specific performance.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the Trial Court and have
the instrument declared a nonenforceable agreement.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. A. L. Clark, the decedent, had been a resident
of Davis County for many years and an outstanding
citizen of the community. He was one of the founders
of the Davis County Bank and had during his lifetime
owned considerable stock in the bank. This dispute in.
volves an agreement made just prior to his death involv.
ing 530 shares of said stock which was voted, controlled
and owned by Mr. A. L. Clark to the time of his death.
Mr. A. L. Clark died May 25, 1968, at the age of 1oi
years and a resident of Davis County, State of Utah.
Two months prior to his death he had signed an "Agree.
ment for Sale of Stocks" (Exhibits "A" and "B"). It
is the effect or construction of this agreement which
the subject matter of this lawsuit. Mr. Bird, the attorney
for Dale D. Clark, prepared this agreement (TR. 36).
After the death of A. L. Clark and on February 28, 1969,
the Executor of the Estate of Mr. A. L. Clark filed a
"Petition for Confirmation of Sale of Personal Property"
(R-1). By this Petition, the Estate sought to have the
Court confirm the sale of 530 shares of Davis County
Bank stock to Mr. Dale Clark for $31,800.00 (See R-1
and 2)
An objection to the confirmation of sale at the pricf
indicated was filed by four of the heirs of A. L. Clark
The heirs filing the Objection indicated to the Court that
they would have no objection to a confirmation of sale
if the Court would accept higher and better bids. ThiE
was rejected by counsel for Dale D. Clark. An Amended
Objection was subsequently filed by the same Objecteri
and an Answer to the Objection was filed by Dale D.
Clark.
2

The agreement, in its entirety, reads as follows:
"AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCKS
"In consideration of the settlement of a lawsuit between Dale D. Clark and Howard S. Clark
and of the promises herein contained and of the
payment of $100.00 by Dale D. Clark to A. L.
Clark, receipt of which by A. L. Clark is hereby
acknowledged the following agreement is made
by the parties :
''l. A. L. Clark is the owner of 530 shares of the

capital stock of the Davis County Bank which
he agrees is sold to Dale D. Clark for the
sum of $60.00 per share, a total price of
$31,800.00.

··2. Dale D. Clark agrees to pay the said sum of
$31,800.00 for said stock upon demand.
''3. The stock shall continue to be vQted, con-__
trolled and owned by A. L. Clark so long as
he lives or uitfi he shall be paid in full for
said stock following demand for payment and
tender of stock by A. L. Clark.
''4. If there shall be any disagreement as to the
interpretation of this agreement, it shall be
resolved by arbitration, each party to name
one arbitrator and they two to select a third
arbitrator, the decision of a majority to be
binding upon the parties.
"Dated March 22, 1968, at Farmington, Utah.
Witness
/s/ Bonnie S. Evans

/s/ A. L. Clark
A. L. Clark
/s/ Dale D. Clark
Dale D. Clark"
3

At the time of the filing of the Amended
the Objecters sought to have it determined whether 01
not this was a proceeding for the "confirmation of the
sale of personal property" under Section 75-10-8, UCA
1953, or if this was a proceeding for the enforcement of
a contract under Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953. Upon the
hearing of the Petition to file the Amended Objection
before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan on April 22,
1969, the Court ruled as follows:
"THE COURT: Well, I believe, Mr. Conder,
while the petition is entitled 'Petition for Confir.
mation of Sale of Personal Property,' it clearly
sets forth the agreement upon which the purchaser,
Dale D. Clark, relies, attaches a copy of the agreement dated March 22nd, 1968. This Court has
understood that the whole proceeding is for authority to perform the agreement entered into by
the deceased.
"Isn't that your understanding¥
"MR. CONDER: That's what I assumed
they'd want to do. I want to make sure of the
position, because I think the statute makes a dif·
f erence between the two.
"THE COURT: Isn't that your understand·
ing, Mr. Bird?
"MR. BIRD: Yes. Yes." (R-18, TR 4 and
5)

The trial was set for May 9, 1969, and the matter
heard before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley. Exhibits
"A" and "B," being copies of the agreement, were intro;
duced into evidence and received by the Court. (TR. 1
and 5) The difference between Exhibits "A" and "B''
consists simply of some additional writing on oni- copY
4

not contained on the other but both are executed copies
of the same agreement, one being held by the Estate of
A. L. Clark and the other one being held by Dale D. Clark.
At the trial and since the proceeding was one to enforce the "contract," the attorney representing the Ohjecters asserted that no claim had been filed pursuant
to Sections 75-9-1 and 75-9-2 of the Utah Code Annotated
1953, and therefore the Court would have to dismiss the
proceeding. There was no claim upon which the Court
could act. (TR. 9 and 10) The attorney representing the
c:;tatt'd to thP Con rt:
· .\iR P1\L:\lt.:R: '.\'pare intert'stt>d in k:nowrng what WP shrntld do as UJ1 PSt<iJP for
par'"·111<> r µTnnp of ,.:to('k.
"

1' u

1

l'

'f) rRT:

:.

-,- i ) " 'r ,

I

'. \w:-;p peo1)lf'

)i: ·

",\i

L-t F
1

/

:.,,\[

onr position.

i(ii ·

,.;,.

i'"'

,-c11Tt>et. And this

·• fn other woTds. we Jiave some stock on hand.
it's heen sold. \Ve
i'hpre's a document that
want to know what to do with iC' (TR. 7)

After sonw discussion between Court and counsel,
it was concluded that since Mr. Dale D. Clark was the
one who was speeifically interested in the enforcement
of the "contract" he should go forward with his proof
m the case. Mr. Bird then put in the exhibit, a copy
of the agreement, and rested. (TR 26). At that time,
the Court then stated:
"THE COURT: (interposing) Well, the
agreement was to be perfonned in the future when
it was signed 1
"MR. BIRD : Yes. The delivery of the stock.

5

The
of thf'
was to be m the future, and delivery of the monPi
for the stock was to be in the future?
·
"MR. BIRD:

Yes.

"THE COURT:
"MR. BIRD:

Yes, sir."

(TR. 27)

Mr. Bird, as counsel for Dale D. Clark, then deter.
mined that perhaps he should put on some evidence re.
garding the demand to be made pursuant to thP term,
of the instrument. Mr. Dale D. Clark testified that
during the lifetime of his father there was newr any 11'
mand made upon him for performance of the agreel!Mt
(TR. 29), and that after the death of his father there ila<
been no demand upon upon him for the perforrnancP of
the
(TR. 29).
The agreement, shown on the face of Exhibits "A''
and "B," was prepared by Mr. Bird as the attorney for
Dale D. Clark. ('TR. 36)
POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL
1. UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE BARS ANY OBLIGATION OF THE EXECUTOR TO DALE D.
CLARK ARISING UNDER THE "AGREEMENT FOR
SALE OF STOCKS."
2. THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE
AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK.
3. THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE
OF STOCK IS ILLUSORY AND LACKING IN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF A. L. CLARK OR IS AT
MOST AN OPTION TO SELL STOCK AT A CERTAIN
SUM WHICH CEASED TO BE EFFECTIVE WITH

6

THE DEATH OF THE OPTIONEE, A. L. CLARK.
4. THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK FAILS
AS A GIFT CAUSA MORTIS.
5. THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK FAILS
AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE BARS ANY OBLIGATION OF THE EXECUTOR TO DALE D.
CLARK ARISING UNDER THE "AGREEMENT FOR
SALE OF STOCKS."

The Executor of the Estate of Amasa Lyman Clark
filed a "Petition for Confirmation of Sale of Personal
Property" on February 25, 1969. The attorney for the
Estate said that he had filed the Petition to determine
whether or not there was a valid agreement and to get
instructions from the Court as to what to do. (TR. 12
and 18)
Neither Dale D. Clark nor anyone on his behalf filed
any claim with the Estate within the time prescribed by
onr statute. The Utah statute is very clear on the point.
75-9-4, UCA 1953, provides as follows:
"All claims arising upon contract, whether the
same are due, not due or contingent, must be presented within the time limited in the notice, and
any claim not presented is barred forever; ... "
(Emphasis added)
Dale D. Clark's position is based upon an alleged
contract This is the very foundation of his action. His
whole position is that he has a contract which he seeks
to have enforced. Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed.,
Vol 3, Sec. 768, p. 503, states:

7

'' . . . The clear efft=>ct of such
a
shown in succeeding sections, is to mah
ment or filing in probate of every 'claim' which
falls within the contl:•mpla tion of th1•
above referred to an absolute condition pn'cedent
to maintaining an action thereon against the ex.
ecutor or administrator, barring forever all
not so presented within the period of the local
statute of non-claim. Frequently even the revivor
of actions pending against the decedent at the
time of his death is precluded by express statute
unless claim on the cause of action is first presented or filed as any otht>r demand."
The language in the statute admits of no
All claims arising on contract must be presened, and thi1
is so whether they are due or whether they are not dtw
or whether they are only contingent. The Utah cases han
so held. In re Anje1l·ierdens Estate, 13 Utah 2d 378, 374
P. 2d 845 (1962); Halloran-Jildge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70
Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927); In re Agees Estate,
Utah 130, 252 Pac. 891 (1927); and In re Neff's Estate,
8 Utah 2d 368, 335 P.2d 403 (1959).

In In re Anjewierdens Estate, the claim was actually
received by the Executor or Probate Court several days
after the expiration of the time for filing claims and
the delay had resulted solely from failure of the claimant's attorney to mail the claim to the proper address.
The delay was nevertheless held fatal to the claim. In
In re Agees Estate, the Court held the provisions of the
statutes requiring timely presentation of contract claims
and prompt suit after presentation were jurisdictional
in nature and that the Probate Court was without powei
to allow claims not made in compliance therewith. In In

8

re Neff's Estate, the Plaintiff had filed a suit before
the death of the decedent. Even though the action was
pending at the death of the decedent so that the decedent's Administrator and other parties interested would
have had. notice of it, the Court nevertheless held the
statutes requiring presentation and claims to the Estate
had to be complied with and that failure to so comply
barred enforcement of the Judgment against the Estate,
even th(i)ugh the Administrator had appeared in the action
and defended it. The head note in this case clearly reflects the decision where it says:
"Where creditor filed unverified complaint
against father and son, partners, complaint was
pending at father's death and administrator of
father's estate was substituted as a party defendant, that no claim was filed within time given
creditors to file, judgment rendered against administrator of father's estate was not enforceable
against the father's estate."

It is clear that the statute is mandatory even when
a contract is still executory following the death of the
decedent. In Halloran-Jud_qc Trust Co. v. Heath, supra,
the decedent's Executors had taken over management of
a building after the death of the decedent in violation of a
contract decedent had made with Plaintiff, under which
Plaintiff was to manage the building. The Plaintiff failed
to present a claim to the Estate's Executors prior to the
commencement of suit and the Court denied Plaintiff
since his claim was a contingent claim within the
terms of the Non-claim Statute and was barred, not having been properly presented. To the same effect are
Lieuer v. Sherman, 130 Colo. 216, 274 P.2d 816; James v.

19

Corvin, 184 Wash. 356, 51 P.2d 689; and Lwndy v. Lemp,
32 Idaho 162, 179 Pac. 738. The cases are collected in
annotations appearing in 41 ALR 144 and 47 ALR 896.
In Lundy v. Lemp, the purchaser of real estate under
a contract with a decedent failed to present a claim to
decedent's Executor. The purchaser had not fully paid
the purchase price when the seller died. The Court held
the purchaser's suit barred by the Non-claim Statute
and also by the purchaser's failure to present his claim
to the Executor prior to commencing suit.
Counsel for Dale D. Clark argues that the Executor
was aware of this claim. We submit, however, that the
mere knowledge of the Executor that someone is orally
asserting a claim is insufficient.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Clayton v.
Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 Pac. 723, 14 Ann. Cas. 9261
had before it the question of whether or not a claim
for taxes due the Estate had to be presented to the Court
pursuant to the statute cited. The Utah Supreme Court
said:
"Had the claim here been barred by the general statute of limitations, or by the special statute,
such as where a claim had been presented and rejected by the executors and suit was not commenced within the time provided by the statute,
or where 1w claim had been presented nor swt
commenced within the time in which a claim would
have been properly presented, the bar of the statute would be a complete defense . ... (Emphwis
added)
In the Dinwoodey case, the Supreme Court held that
the filing of a verified Complaint within the time pre·
10

scribed constituted a suffieient claim. In the subsequent
c.ase of In re: Jones Estate, (1940), 99 Utah 373, 104 P.
2d 210, at p. 212, the Supreme Court again cited the
Dinwoodey case and said:
"In Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93
P. 723, 14 Ann. Cas. 926, we used this language:
'Mere knowledge on the part of the1 executor or
administrator of the existence of a debt • • • is
not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of
presentation. • • • the defense that the claim is
barred by the statute of limitations cannot be
waived by the executor or administrator."

At the trial, Dale D. Clark's counsel argued that the
nonfilling of the claim was not timely raised. We submit,
however, that this is something that cannot be waived
and thus goes to the very heart of this issue of whether
or not there is any "agreement" that can be specifically
enforced by the Court.
In the Clayton v. Dinwoodey case, this Court said:

" ... This principle, however, must not be
confused with that involved, where the claim is
barred by the general statue of limitations, and
because of the bar cannot be allowed by the executor or administrator or the judge, as provided in
section 3857, or where the claim was neither presented nor suit commenced within the time in
which the claim could properly have been presented. For the defense that the claim is barred by
the statute of limitations cannot be waived by the
executor or administrator. Fullerton v. Bailey,
17 Utah, 85, 53 Pac. 1020; Reay v. Heazelton, 128
Cal. 335, 60 Pac. 977."
This Court has previously held on several occasions
that the
of limitations cannot be waived by the
11

Executor even though it is not pleaded as a defense. Th,
case of Gulbranson v. Thompson, 118 Utah 452, 222 Pac
590, held:

"It is next contended that plaintiff's claim If
barred by our general statute of limitations except
as to those services that were rendered within (hp
four years immediately preceding the death ol
plaintiff's mother, our statute barring actiom
upon express or implied oral agreements or ac
counts, where an action is not brought within four
years after the conclusion of the services or th1
last item of an account. Plaintiff's counsel, how
ever, insists that this defense is not available to
the defendant, for the reason that the statute or
limitations ·was not pleaded in the answer. If
were an action between two living adversariei.
then, according to the de-cisions of this court coun
sel's contention would be sound. In view, how
u\·er, that the action is against the administrator
of a deceased person's estate for a claim arising
during the lifetime of the deceased, the genera!
rule that the statute must be pleaded in order to
be available does not apply. This court has at
least in two cases expressly held that an adrnini1
trator cannot waive the defense of the statute ol
limitations under our statute, and hence his fa//.
ure to plead the same cannot avail the claimanl
Fullerton "'7. Bailey, 17 Utah 85, 53 Pac.1020; ClaY
ton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 Pac. 723, .ll
Ann. Cas. 926. Such is also the rule in Califorma
Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335, 60 Pac. 977, anil
cases there cited." (Emphasis added)
It follows that inasmuch as Dale D. Clark failed tu
present a claim of any nature whatever to the
within the time limited by tht>. Notice to Creditors 1•
now barred from obtaining any relief under the M:rrr
uwnt for Sale of Stocks executed by the decedent.
12

POINT II
THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE
AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK.

.:

Proper 11ierulinus are 11, Jnrisdictionul prerequiden rl/l/i/l/[ion I)((/ clui111 for specific perform11/11ler Setfio11 7:)-11-26 thrrmgh 75-11-.'Jl, UCA

sdi 11· f/11'
11}/(I

:-;edion 7!"i-11-'l.7, UCA 1953, proYides:
ures1'1ir1itio11 of a. 1·erifiPd pet tion
/;11 111111 1;•'rso11 clarim111g f.u lie entitled fo such con·, 111

the

0

1'<'.1/0rtCI', a:-::-:if-,rr1ment, transfer or deliverv from
an executor or admmistrator, setting forth the

facts upon which the elaim is predicated, the
Conrt or Clerk mnst appoint a time and place
for hearing· the petition, which shall be npon notice." (Emphasis added)
Section 75-11-28 refers to a full hearing "upon the
petition and objections" and Section 75-11-29, lICA 1953,
refers to "the petitioner." In Rogers v. Nichols, 75 Utah
290, 284 Pac. 992 ( 1930), no proper petition to the Prohate Court for a Decree of Specific Performance had been
made by a claimant who asserted his entitlement to a
conveyance of real property. The Probate Court had
nevertheless decreed specific performance, assuming the
issne was before it on certain Affidavits and other papers.
The Utah Supreme Court held the Probate Court entirely
without proper jurisdiction to direct specific performance
of a contract to sell real property where no proper
pleadingt-; had been prt>sented in the Probate Court and,
in particular, where no Petition had been filed by the
13

buyer for such relief. Similarly, in Free v. Little, 31 Utan
449; 88 Pac. 407 ( 1907), the Supreme Court held the fail
ure to file the Verified Petition as required by
within the time limits proved fatal to the right of SJ)€c)fie
performance, even though under the terms of the contracl
the time for buyer's performance had not expired when
the seller's Estate was probated.
Dale D. Clark has never filed a Verified Petition here
in and has made no Petition nor filed any pleading in tht
Probate Court requesting a Decree of Specific Perform.
ance. The only Petition filed is that of the
ann
that Petition is wholly out of order and is not in pro]lfr
form.
No proper pleadings having been presented to th1
Probate Court, the Probate Court is without jurisdiction
to further proceed.
B. Dececised was not bound by contract to convey
or tratnSfer anythimg to Dale D. Clark as required oy
Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953.
Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953, provides:
"When a person who is bound by contract in
writing to convey any real estate or who is boiw4
by contract in writing to assign, transfer or
liver any personal property, shares of capita!
stock, bonds or other choses in action, dies befon
making the conveyance, assignment, transfer or
delivery; and in a.ll cases whe·n sitch decedent
if living, might be compelled to make such co·n·
veyance, assignment, transfer or delivery, tht
court may make a decree authorizing his t>xecntor
or administrator to convey such real estate, or 11'
14

assign, transfer or dl:'liver such personal property,
of capital stock, bonds or other choses in
action, to the person m titled thereto." (Emphasis
added)
The subj<:>et "Agreement for Sale of Stocks" does not
h.i·
tt>nns hind .\. L. Clark or his ExPcutor to do anyrhiug. ThP
does not contain a single word
, 11Jlit,'1ng A. L. Clark to transfl·r the stock. At most, it
him tht' right, hut not the obligation, to make dei!land for paYnwrn dnd tend\•r the stock to Dale D. Clark,
,1 which P\ ent Dalt· D. Clark was hound to pay A. L.
'Jurk $b0.00 ! .,.1 ..;l1an'. t«.uld tlw
havP been
1·1,l!;pelled t(J .i1akl· <rn a:-:s1gnrm•nt. transfer or deltvery1
\1, 1 Paragraph ::l ot the agrl:'ern1·nt
in-ovides
':hat "the ,.:to<'k ,.:hall <·ontinnt> to he vott•d, controllPd and
fnrned h>· A. L. Clark for as long as hP live!" or until he
he vaid in full for said stock f o1loicing demand for
paynwnt l1y A. L. Clark." (Emphasis added) Under this
provision of the agreement, A. L. Clark clearly intended
to retain entire control over the matter of his performance. He could not have been compelled to do anything.
Further, the agreement nowhere: provides that A. L. Clark
or his Executor shall transfer and deliver the stock upon
or after his death. Nowhere does it give either his Executor or Dale Clark the right to demand payment and tender the stock or require the same. The agreement is solely
conditioned upon demand for payment and tender of
stock by A. L. Clark himself. The agreemoot totally and
completely fails to meet the standards required by Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953, for specific performance, and
hPnce such could not not be decreed by the Court even if
pro1wr plf'adings had been filed so as to enable the Court
1
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to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in the matter. In Wii
son v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409, the Court
held that "in order for appellant to be entitled to reliti
sought the proof must show the decedent was found, h
contract in writing, to convey ... and that it was sur·ii
a contract that he, if living might be compelled to rnak'
the conveyance." 54 P. 2d at 411. See also In re Leui.,
Estate, 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P. 2d 654.

C. The Court is without jurisdiction to decree spr
cific performance where the right of the Petitioner is/,
doubt.

th'"
tJ11c>

hrf

a hearing· at-'
:rf fiHJ
tn baYP
or' thv (Ontntn i;..
eourt ;1111::-;t (ti::OllllS1' thP ]ktiticii

"'":r:ie1_:·ic· ;i1, 1'
'"

ip

do11htt11

Rrrncroft Probate Practice. Section 532. point; llli!
that t'\tatutes similar to those of Utah, whieh aJlo,r :.
Probate Court to decree specific preformance of a con
tract regarding personality, are unusual and a "distimt
innovation." Since it is settled law that such contract'
are not specifically enforceable in equity absent ven
unusual circumstances, Bancroft further points out that
the provisions allowing specific enforcement by the Pro
bate Court appear to be practically useless, particular!:
since it is also provided that where a Petitioner's righi
to specific performance is found to be doubtful hy th'
Probate Court it must dismiss the proceeding. HerP, not
only do we have no proper Petition but rights and douhi
alone compels dismissal of even a proper proceeding.
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POINT 111
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE
STOCK IS ILLUSORY AND LACKING IN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF A. L. CLARK OR
IS AT MOST AN OPTION TO SELL STOCK AT
.\ CERAIN SUM WHICH CEASED TO BE EFFEC'I'IVE WITH THE DEATH OF THE OPTIONEE, A.
L. CLARK.

OF

A. The subject agreement is illusory and lacking
n obligation.
Mr. Dale D. Clark testified as follows:
"Q. Mr. Clark, I asked you if you could recognize the handwriting that appeared on the back
of Exhibit 'B,' and as I recall you said you could
not recall that handwriting.
"Do you recall who prepared Exhibit 'A' and
the front part of Exhibit 'B,' dictated it or drafted
it1
"A. Yes. This was drafted. This is one of
the drafts prepared by my attorney.
"Q. Is that Mr. Bird T
"A. Yes." (TR. 36)
It is elementary that in the interpretation of the contract it is construed against the drafter - in this case,
Dale D. Clark. 4Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Sec.
621. Therefore, any ambiguities in the subject agreement
will be interpreted in favor of the heirs and Executor.
When a promissor retains an option concerning the extent of his performance or promises to do a thing only
when it pleases him, he is not bound - the agreement is
only illusory, no enforceable legal promise having been
made. Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M.
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729, 418
2d 187 (1966); R. J. Daum Construction Co.'
Child; 22 Utah 194, 247 P .2d 817 ( 1952) ; Lawrence Blot!
Co., Inc. v. Palston, 123 CA 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856; Mitch/!
Novelty Co. v. United Mfg., 94 F. Supp. 612 (Ill. 195Ui
The subject agreement is illusory as regards the perfonu
ance of A. L. Clark because it nowhere provides thatA.L
Clark is compelled to do anything. Under it, he has tie
right to determine when and if he should ·sell his st-OcK
He had no obligatl.on to do anything unless he felt
inclined. It follows that the agreement must fail becam1
it is illusory.
811

B. The subject agreement at most is an option/,
sell stock.
If the subject agreement is not completely illmor.1
lacking in obligation; ineffectual, it is at most by its term·
an option to sell stock at such time as A. L. Clark shoul1:
elect, upon the exercise of which Dale D. Clark
have become obligated to pay $31,800.00. The agreewen·
is necessarily a unilateral contract which bound the 01
tionee (A. L. Clark) to do nothing but granted him tn·
right to sell his stock before his death in the manner W
cified in the option. 1 WiUiston On Contracts (3rd Ed.:
Sec. 618. The agreement, by its terms, is exactly this ani:
no more. Particularly is this so when it is construed moi'
strongly against Dale D. Clark. By its terms, Dale D
Clark did not become absolutely obligated to deliwi
cash but became obligated to do so only upon demandfo1
payment and tender of stock by A. L. Clark. The agreP
ment, by its terms, gives A. L. Clark all of the rights in
volved and placed upon Dale D. Clark all of the dutieo
which duties were callable at the option and at tht>lim
1
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that A. L. Clark should elect.
The Trial Court in its Findings of Fact finds that
Dale D. Clark wrus not the owner of the stock when it
found as follows :
"3. Following the appointment of Zions First
National Bank as executor of the estate, Dale D.
Clark, contacted the executor and advised it that he
wanted to buy the stock and was prepared to go
forward with his agreement, and that he was able
to perform."
There can be no specific performance of an unaccepted
c

l'twn.

"There can be no specific perfonnance of an
unaccepted option. An option holder cannot enforce it until he elects and binds himself to perform
it, thereby transfonning it into a mutual contract
to sell and to buy, whereas before such election it
was unilateral. It is the contract consummated
by the acceptance of the option which the courts
enforce." 49 Am. Jnr. Specific Performance, p.140.
See also Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 12A,
Secs. 5634 and 5635, to the same effect.

C. The option to se.U expired with tke death of A. L.
Clark.
It is clear that no demand has ever be.en made by
A. L. Clark during his lifetime nor his Estate since his
death. Nowhere in the agreement is it provided that the
right to exercise the option should survive to the Executor of the Estate of A. L. Clark. Rather, it is specifically
provided that the demand for payment and tender of
stock should be made "by A. L. Clark." A. L. Clark not
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having made demand nor tendered the stock prior fo lii
death, the option or the offer was terminated. Sul'ii
is the general rule. As Williston points out,
"Assuming that the formation of a contra
required mutual mental assent of the parties ann
offer and acceptance were merly evidence of surr
assent, it would be obviously impossible that i
contract should be formed where either party :
the transaction died before this assent Wa.5 on
tained. That such assent was formerly though!
necessary seems probable, and as to death, th1,
theory is still maintained. Accordingly, it is gen
erally held that the death of the offeror tenninatl'i
the offer. Since an offer can be accepted only IF
the person to whom it is made, the death of the
offeree also has the effect of precluding the ]JOssi
bility of the contract as does the destruction 01
the subject matter." 1 Williston on Contracts, (3111
Ed.), Sec. 62.
.,
1

11

A. L. Clark having died prior to the time of his ai
sent to a firm contraet was obtained, no contract ever
arose and the option terminated.

D. If the option did inure to the benefit of the Er
ecutor, it wowd be improper for the Executor to exerc1"
it.
Assuming the Executor does have the right to exer
cise the option, which it plainly does not, no tender ami
demand having been made by it, there is no predicate upon
which specific performance may be deceed. Rude 18
Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 Pac. 560. A further problem j,
presented by the fact that the option is not particnlarli
valuable to the Estate and in point of fact has a negatw
value. As pointed out in In re Fullmer's Estate, 203 Ca!
20

693, 265 Pac. 920, an option can be an asset of the Estate
which should be preserved, but only if it is actually valuable. The option is not valuable and the Executor would
therefore be liable to the Estate for the loss occasioned
to the Estate by its exercise. Bancroft, Probate Practice,
SPe. 529. The clear duty of the Executor is to sell personal
property only if such is in the best interest of the Estate
and those interested. Sections 75-10-1 and 75-10-8, UCA
1953. It is the obligation of the Executor to obtain maximum value for that sold. Sections 75-10-7 and 75-10-15,
H'A 1953.

POINT IV
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK
AS A GIFT CAUSA MORTIS.

FAILS

It may be argued that the agreement shows an intent on the part of A. L. Clark that Dale D. Clark should
have 530 shares of the capital stock of the Davis County
Bank upon the death of A. L. Clark and that the difference between the value of said stock and the sum
Dale D. Clark agreed to purchase was the subject of
a gift. Any such contention must fail because the law is
clear that there can be no valid donation causa mortis
without actual manual delivery to the donee personally,
or to some third person as his agent, of the subject of the
gift-in this case, 530 shares of the capital stock of
the Davis County Bank. The failure of the decedent to
part absolutely with the shares of stock in his lifetime
is fatal. As stated by the Court in Basket vs. Hassell,
107 U.S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500:
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''A delivery in terms \Yhich confer:- upon tlir
donee power to control the fund after the. death
of the donor and by the instrument itself, it i.
presently payable, is h'stamPntary in d1aradPJ
and not good as a gift."

The subject agreement does not operate inter vivoi.
In fact, it does not indicate any intent to operate after
the death of A. L. Clark. If such an intention be im.
plied, still any such attempted disposition fails for fail
ure of the decedent to relinquish control prior to
death. Allen vs. Hendrick, 104 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 73:J:
Hillman vs. YoU!ng, 64 Orn. n, 127 Pac. 793; Nobel io
Garden, 46 Cal. 225, 79 Pac. 83 ( 1905) ; and Norton u.
Norton's Estate, 41CA614, 183 Pac. 214.

I
I

POINT V
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK
FAILS AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION.

The Statute of Wills provides that a testamentary
disposition must be subscribed at the end thereof in the
presence of two attesting witnesses; that the Testator
must declare to the attesting witnesses that the instru·
ment is his Will and that the two attesting witnesses ·
must sign their names as witnesses at the end of the i
Will, each, at the Testator's request, in his presence and
in the presence of the other. Section 74-1-5, UCA 1953.
The subject instrument does not comply with these stan·
<lards. Further, it is elementary that a Will must show
the intention of the Testator to leave certain property
or it will fail. The subject instrument does not sho1r
by its terms that the Testator, A. L. Clark, intended to
bequeath anything to Dale D. Clark.
1
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CONCLUSION
1'he statutes and other authorities cited above make
it ,.J!:'ar that any obligation of the Executor to Dale D.
Clark is barred hy the Non-claim Statute; that the Court
J.'

11·itl10nt jurisdiction to direct s1wcific perfonnance

mH'l,

proper pl Pa dings ha n

not been filed; that specific

pµrfnrmancP cannot be decreed inasmuch as the subject
ag-rµPnwnt does not ohligate A. L. Clark or his Estate
,0

transf Pr :-:han';-; to DalP D. Clark and A. L. Clark

,,i\i1l

:'! Iii"

nc1t

;iavP lW\'11

r:ornvelled to make such a transfer

lifttinw as required hy statute; that in ease of

r1onht a:-; to thP availability of specific performance the
ProhatP Conrt 11rnst dismiss t}JP ]ll"OCPedings; that the
agrePment is illusory in nahue and not enforceahlP as a contrad; that at most the subject agreement
was an option to sell stock, exercisable only by A. L.
Clark, which bPcame void and unenforceable at his death;
that Pren if the option had not expired at the death of
A. L. Clark, it would be inappropriate and wrongful for
th<'

to attempt to exercise it under the circum-

stances; and that the instruml:'nt totally fails as a gift
causa mortis or as an attempted testamentary disposition.
The Trial Court should be reversed and the Petition should be denied.
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